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xi
 Th e key terms in this book’s subtitle – “mapping,” “global,” and “interface” – 
refl ect our approach to analyzing the relationship between human rights and 
intellectual property. 
 Consider fi rst the cartographical trope, “mapping.” It is possible to envision 
intellectual property law and human rights law as the product of the gradual 
accretion and spread of international and domestic laws and institutions. Th e 
terrain of international intellectual property law was the fi rst to emerge. Initially 
the subject of discrete bilateral agreements between sovereign nations, its mod-
ern form came to be established with the two great multilateral intellectual 
property treaties from the end of the 19th century: the Paris Convention on 
industrial property (1883) and the Berne Convention on literary and artistic 
works (1886). Th e international human rights regime emerged more recently, 
with the founding of the United Nations aft er World War II, and, in particular, 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
 From these beginnings, the terrain occupied by both issue areas has 
expanded signifi cantly in substantive reach, in prescriptive detail, and in 
geographic scope. In the intellectual property context, the international law 
relating to patents illustrates this point. At the end of the 19th century, the 
desirability of domestic – let alone international – patent protection was a 
matter of sharp debate, even among industrialized nations. For this reason, 
the Paris Convention contains few substantive rules – although its national 
treatment and international priority rules for patent registrations were 
important achievements – and (like the Berne Convention) it has no eff ec-
tive enforcement mechanisms. 
 Today, in contrast, international intellectual property law imposes a 
 signifi cant and detailed array of substantive and enforcement obligations. 
Th e Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 
which came into force in 1995, obliges member states to recognize patents 
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in all fi elds of technology (subject to transitional arrangements for develop-
ing nations). TRIPS also dictates the standard by which domestic law devia-
tions from international patent rules are to be tested, and it sets forth detailed 
requirements in areas such as domestic enforcement procedures. Perhaps 
most signifi cantly, noncompliance with TRIPS can trigger meaningful sanc-
tions, as a result of the treaty’s integration into the international trade regime 
now administered by the World Trade Organization. Th at body, through its 
dispute settlement system, also contributes to the development of interna-
tional intellectual property norms, along with a number of other key  agencies, 
most notably the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Th e 
expansion of international patent law did not stop with TRIPS. International 
norms continue to emerge and develop as a result of  multilateral, regional, 
and bilateral agreements. A potentially important new initiative, the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), is currently being negotiated. 
If adopted, ACTA will shape international intellectual property rules and 
enforcement mechanisms in a range of diff erent contexts. 
 Th e space occupied by the international human rights regime has also 
grown signifi cantly since its inauguration in the middle of the 20th century. 
Th e Universal Declaration gave birth to two foundational treaties that entered 
into force in 1976 – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Th e 
Covenants, together with the general comments, case law, and recommenda-
tions of their respective treaty bodies, and the decisions of regional human 
rights courts and commissions, have signifi cantly bolstered the prescriptive 
force of human rights law. A particularly noteworthy development has been 
the widening acceptance of social, economic, and cultural rights that, until 
the 1990s, remained mostly underdeveloped, particularly in the West. New 
recognition of the human rights of groups has also emerged – commitments 
that are especially important to the world’s indigenous peoples. 
 In terms of enforcement, the most important activities are occurring at the 
regional and domestic levels, especially in Europe but also in the Americas 
and other regions. National courts increasingly adjudicate human rights 
treaties directly or draw upon international norms when construing national 
constitutions and statutes. At all levels, multiple review mechanisms and judi-
cial bodies shape human rights law through their investigative and interpre-
tive activities. Indeed, one critique of the international human rights regime 
is that it suff ers from a surfeit of rules, institutions, and decision makers that 
risks weakening the system as a whole. 
 As a result of these and related developments, the respective terrains of 
both the human rights and intellectual property regimes have grown signifi -
cantly and the intersections between them have expanded. Th ere now exists a 
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broad range of legal, social, political, practical, and philosophical issues that 
straddle both fi elds. Th ese intersections are evolving rapidly, requiring a new 
conceptual cartography to help map the changing landscape. 
 We explore a number of these intersections in this book. To continue 
with the patent example introduced earlier, consider the human right to the 
 highest attainable standard of health in the light of the protection of pharma-
ceutical patents. Many nations once denied patents for new drugs on pub-
lic health grounds; today, TRIPS obliges member nations to recognize and 
enforce patents in all fi elds of technology, including medicines. As a result of 
these countervailing legal commitments, government agencies, international 
organizations, and civil society groups must engage with the disciplines of 
both human rights and intellectual property to develop eff ective, just, and 
enduring responses to public health crises and to identify new mechanisms 
for harnessing  private innovation to serve the wider social good. Th is is 
already occurring as a growing number of actors typically concerned with 
human rights issues are becoming engaged in intellectual property issues and 
(although perhaps to a lesser extent) vice versa. 
 Th is discussion also underscores the salience of the term “global” in the 
book’s subtitle. State and private actors in legal regimes have long recognized 
the inadequacy of purely domestic responses. In the human rights  context, 
the atrocities of the Second World War engendered a commitment to the 
idea that sovereign nations cannot be the sole arbiter of the fundamental 
human entitlements. Th e founders of the United Nations and the draft ers 
of the Universal Declaration recognized that human rights must be bol-
stered by international institutions and international legal obligations. In the 
intellectual property context, both private fi rms and governments have long 
recognized that eff ective responses to piracy and counterfeiting, and, more 
recently, the protection of genetic resources and indigenous knowledge, can-
not be adequately addressed at the domestic level. In addition, there now 
exist important feedback mechanisms in intellectual property lawmaking, 
whereby norms developed at the international and domestic levels mutually 
infl uence each other. 
 As we discuss in  Chapter 1 , the existence of  any meaningful engagement 
between the two areas of law is a relatively recent phenomenon. Scholars 
and policymakers in each regime are only beginning to recognize areas of 
mutual concern. Because law is shaped by human agency, the way in which 
human rights and intellectual property intersect is not an inevitable or pre-
determined process. Th e actors who engage with the legal and social policy 
issues to which both regimes are relevant have a large measure of discretion 
in determining the character of this interaction. Will there be a seismic clash, 
a rupturing of tectonic plates, as the two areas move ever closer together and 
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fi nally collide? Or will the engagement be carefully considered, nuanced, and 
accommodating? Our preference is for the latter kind of engagement, and 
one of the aims of this book is to provide the substantive materials and origi-
nal analytical content to help others to explore the intersections between the 
two regimes in a productive and coherent fashion. 
 Th ese considerations also explain the use of the term “interface” in our sub-
title. Th e most familiar use of the term is in the computing context. It denotes 
mechanisms for conjoining distinct or contrasting elements and systems: soft -
ware and hardware, or interfaces between operating systems. Human rights 
and intellectual property exhibit distinctive systemic characteristics. For 
the most part they have evolved independently – although, as we discuss in 
 Chapter 3 , there is an oft en-overlooked set of human rights obligations that 
recognize the rights of creators in their artistic and scientifi c works – and have 
been shaped by diff erent sets of actors in distinct institutional contexts and 
informed by divergent analytical traditions. A key aim of the book, suggested 
by our use of the term “interface,” is to provide a structure for dialog and 
engagement between these two – hitherto largely separate – systems. 
 To that end,  Chapter 1 off ers a conceptual overview of the relationship 
between human rights and intellectual property, as well as a brief summary 
of each area of law. Th e latter will be useful for readers less familiar with the 
traditions and substance of one or both areas.  Chapter 1 also explores diff er-
ent ways that the relationship between human rights and intellectual property 
has been understood by scholars and in diff erent legal and policy contexts. 
Th e chapters that follow develop the latter theme and present “case studies” 
of several distinct controversies.  Chapter 2 considers the right to health and 
patented pharmaceuticals;  Chapter 3 addresses the human rights associated 
with certain types of creative activity;  Chapter 4 examines the rights of free-
dom of expression and cultural participation and the right to benefi t from 
scientifi c progress;  Chapter 5 explores the right to education and the potential 
tensions with copyright protection in learning materials;  Chapter 6 examines 
the human right to food in the context of intellectual property protections in 
plant genetic materials;  Chapter 7 considers the claims that have emerged 
in the context of indigenous peoples’ struggles for recognition of their rights 
in respect of traditional knowledge and other forms of cultural production. In 
a fi nal chapter, we off er a fuller exposition of our own framework for con-
ceptualizing the most productive connections between the human rights and 
intellectual property regimes. 
 Th e decision to defer the exposition of our conceptual framework until the 
Conclusion in part refl ects the genesis of this book. Several years ago, one 
of us developed a law school course entitled Human Rights and Intellectual 
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Property. Partly because of the novelty of the topic, no teaching materials 
existed, a gap that endures today. Teaching the course was a very fulfi lling 
experience. Th e course brought together students from an array of diff er-
ent backgrounds and with a range of diff erent interests – not only intellec-
tual property and human rights, but also international trade and indigenous 
peoples’ law and policy issues. Th e course invited these groups to engage 
with each other across the intellectual, heuristic, and, sometimes, cultural 
divides that had informed their thinking about the various issues to which 
human rights and intellectual property are relevant – issues that we consider 
at greater length in the case studies in each chapter of this book. Th e aims 
of the course included introducing students to the substantive laws, policies, 
and institutional frameworks of both human rights and intellectual prop-
erty. But a more ambitious aim was to invite students to develop their own 
conceptions of how the two areas might interact. Although we have our own 
views on how the contours of the interface might be mapped, as a pedagogi-
cal matter we believe that readers’ engagement with this topic will be richer 
if they are also encouraged to form their own views as to how this might be 
achieved. Hence our decision on the placement of the fi nal chapter. 
 Th ese concerns also refl ect the thinking behind our use of the term 
 “map ping” – the present participle form of the verb. Engagement between 
the two areas of law is a dynamic and evolving process, one to which we hope 
this book will contribute. But we labor under no pretension that this work is 
by any measure complete. We look forward to engaging with the responses – 
including, we imagine, rigorous critiques – that this text might invite. 
 Our aspirations for the book also extend beyond the classroom context. We 
hope that it will contribute to the emerging scholarship in the fi eld and to the 
policy debates that are beginning to occur in both regimes. Here we off er a per-
sonal anecdote. When we fi rst entered law teaching in the 1990s, human rights 
and intellectual property were separate components of our respective research 
agendas. Our decision to focus our scholarly eff orts in these two discrete areas 
was highly unusual. In fact, a senior colleague counseled one of us to choose 
one fi eld and abandon the other, warning that there was little benefi t – and 
potentially much risk – in attempting to develop expertise in two such diff erent 
and unrelated fi elds. Th e response off ered by the recipient of this well-meaning 
advice was to acknowledge the lack of substantive connections between the 
two legal regimes, but to counter that there was much to be learned by inter-
acting with diff erent communities of scholars, government offi  cials, and civil 
society groups, who rarely, if ever, interacted directly with each other. 
 More than a decade later, much has changed. When we now explain to 
colleagues and students that our research explores the intersections between 
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intellectual property and human rights, the usual response is a gleam of 
 recognition and a question or two – most oft en about patented medicines and 
HIV-AIDS, but increasingly about freedom of expression and online tech-
nologies or the moral rights of artists. We are hardly alone in exploring these 
issues. As we indicated earlier, growing numbers of civil society organizations 
now include both human rights and intellectual property in their mandates, 
oft en specializing in subissues such as patents and the right to health, access 
to knowledge, or the intersection of human rights, intellectual property, and 
development. And the global network of commentators and journalists who 
write about the interface of the two fi elds is expanding, as revealed by the 
numerous and diverse entries in this book’s extensive References. 
 For law students, as well as students in cognate disciplines, such as political 
theory and international relations, much of the value of the book may lie in 
the extensive Notes and Questions that follow the analysis of each  substantive 
topic. Th ese sections invite the kind of deep engagement and interrogation 
of substantive issues and conceptual frameworks that characterize university-
level instruction, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. We also hope 
that this book will be useful in other contexts and for other actors, including 
government offi  cials, international organizations, activists, and civil society 
groups. To that end, discussions of substantive topics oft en are followed by 
Issues in Focus. Th ese sections perform a number of functions, including sum-
marizing recent developments and highlighting emerging issues. By deploy-
ing a range of diff erent analytical techniques and materials, we hope that the 
book can be used by, and will be useful for, a wider range of constituencies. 
 Finally, we would like to acknowledge the many scholars who have contrib-
uted to the writing of this book with comments and criticisms. Th ey include 
Barbara Atwood, Molly Beutz, Jamie Boyle, Audrey Chapman, Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Maureen Garmon, Toni Massaro, Ruth Okediji, and Peter Yu. 
We are also grateful for the help of several research assistants, including Laura 
Duncan, Eric Larson, Lisa Lindemenn, María Méndoza, Casey Mock, Pedro 
Paranagua, Meryl Th omas, and Amy Zavidow. Erin Daniel provided invalu-
able assistance in obtaining permissions to reproduce copyrighted materials. 
Last, but by no means least, are the unswerving dedication and patience of 
our respective partners, David Boyd and Bryan Patchett, the acknowledg-
ment of whose manifold contributions is itself a refl ection of hard-fought 
human rights struggles. 
 Laurence R. Helfer Graeme W. Austin 
 Durham, North Carolina, USA Wellington, New Zealand 
 December 2010 
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 Th is book analyzes the interface of human rights and intellectual property 
from multiple perspectives.  Chapter 1 introduces the major legal, institu-
tional, and political aspects of each regime, explains how they came into 
increasing contact over the past decade, and explores alternative frameworks 
for conceptualizing their relationship. Each of the remaining chapters adopts 
a predominantly substantive orientation that examines in depth specifi c 
intersections between certain human rights and intellectual property protec-
tion rules. In this concluding chapter, we shift  focus to elaborate the major 
transsubstantive themes that are interwoven through the preceding materials. 
Our aim is twofold. First, and more modestly, we seek to illuminate connec-
tions that transcend specifi c “hot button” controversies and to off er deeper 
insights about the interconnections between the two legal regimes. Second, 
and more ambitiously, we off er our own analytical framework to assist schol-
ars, policymakers, civil society groups, and students in conceptualizing the 
relationship between human rights and intellectual property. 
 We begin in  Section 8.1 by reiterating the inevitability of the human 
rights–intellectual property interface and by rejecting – both as a matter of 
principle and as a matter of practical politics – arguments for maintaining a 
fi rewall between the two regimes and avoiding the diffi  cult work of normative 
engagement.  Section 8.2 evaluates three proposals to demarcate the bound-
ary lines between human rights and intellectual property, proposals whose 
particularities we describe in greater detail in previous chapters.  Section 8.3 
off ers our own conception of the human rights–intellectual property inter-
face, synthesizing and expanding upon the ideas developed in previous 
chapters. We distinguish between the  protective and  restrictive functions of 
international human rights law in the intellectual property context and pro-
pose a framework that identifi es when human rights concerns favor revising 
 Chapter 8 
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existing intellectual property protection rules or otherwise restructuring the 
incentives for human creativity and innovation. 
 8.1.  Th e Unavoidable Intersection of Human Rights 
and Intellectual Property 
 Th e previous chapters of this book describe the growing network of inter-
national organizations, government agencies, civil society groups, attorneys, 
commentators, and journalists whose work focuses on both human rights 
and intellectual property issues. Many of the individuals who participate 
in this network view the increasing intersections between the two regimes 
as benefi cial. Some, however, are suspicious of these developments, prefer-
ring instead to maintain or even fortify the boundary between the regimes. 
Others take aim at specifi c points of intersection, claiming that the  overlap 
of previously unrelated rules and institutions will result in deleterious 
legal or policy outcomes. 
 Th is opposition is partly engendered by a resistance to change among 
actors who are habituated to the discourse of one complex legal and polit-
ical system but not the other. But this resistance is animated by more than 
a refl exive fear of the unfamiliar. Th e two communities speak very diff er-
ent languages. Intellectual property commentators, especially those working 
in the Anglo-American tradition, employ the analytical tools of utilitari-
anism and welfare economics to evaluate the trade-off s between incentives 
and access and the consequences for the individuals and fi rms that create, 
own, and consume intellectual property products. Th e international human 
rights movement, by contrast, engages in a discourse of absolutes that seeks 
to delineate the negative and positive duties of states to respect and pro-
mote inalienable individual freedoms. As a result, to label something as a 
“human right” oft en invokes – in rhetoric if not always in reality – a language 
of trumps and unconditional demands. Th is emphasis on categorical rights 
and responsibilities appears ill suited to the rapidly changing technological 
and economic environment in which intellectual property rules operate, an 
environment that oft en engenders calls for incremental recalibrations of the 
balance between incentives and access. 
 A second basis for resistance to the intersection of human rights and intellec-
tual property stems not from concerns about each regime as it actually exists, 
but rather from opposition to actors who make rhetorical and, we believe, 
infl ated claims grounded in one regime to support arguments for changing 
the other. Commentators on both sides have expressed concerns about such 
overclaiming. Some in the human rights community, for example, fear that 
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intellectual property owners – in particular,  multinational corporations – 
will invoke the creators’ rights and property rights provisions of  international 
instruments to lock in maximalist intellectual property rules that will further 
concentrate wealth in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. Parts of 
the intellectual property community, by contrast, have expressed the concern 
that seemingly vague calls for states to “respect,  protect, ensure, and fulfi ll” 
economic and social rights are code words for more  radical campaigns to 
promote government intervention in private innovation markets and radi-
cally scale back or even abolish intellectual property protection. A common 
factor that unites both sets of fears is the focus on extremist arguments that 
ignore the actual structure and content of each legal regime. 
 A third explanation for resistance to the human rights–intellectual prop-
erty interface stems from a concern with fragmentation of international 
regimes, overlapping competencies of international institutions, and con-
fl icts among legal obligations. Worries that the international legal system is 
becoming overly fragmented are widespread. Th at system, unlike its national 
counterparts, lacks a single legislative, executive, or judicial body with man-
datory, universal powers. It is composed of disaggregated and decentralized 
rules and institutions that include thousands of multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral treaties and customary laws; myriad nonbinding declarations and 
resolutions and other “soft  law” norms; intergovernmental organizations 
with diverse memberships and subject matter competencies; international 
tribunals, review bodies, and arbitral panels with diff erent jurisdictional 
mandates; and formal and informal networks of government, private, and 
hybrid regulators. 
 Anxieties relating to the fragmentation of international legal regimes are 
exacerbated by institutional competence concerns. Since the adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement in the mid-1990s, many important intellectual prop-
erty controversies have been litigated within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Th e merger of trade and intellectual property has provoked a wealth 
of scholarly debate, much of it unfl attering. But calls for the international 
trading system to give greater consideration to human rights concerns – both 
those related specifi cally to intellectual property and more generally – raise 
diffi  cult issues as to whether WTO decision makers are adequately equipped 
to mediate these competing values. 
 At the level of rule confl ict, fragmentation concerns run especially high 
where human rights, intellectual property, and trade intersect. Th e applica-
ble rules oft en pull in opposite directions, suggesting to some observers that 
their interaction is a zero sum game in which the only legal and policy choice 
is between wider access in the present or more innovation in the future, 
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never both. Th ese concerns have motivated international review bodies and 
commentators to propose normative hierarchies that privilege one regime 
over the other where relevant rules confl ict. As the analysis of these hierar-
chies in  Chapter 1 reveals, however, these eff orts are insuffi  ciently theorized 
and highly contested. Government offi  cials, adjudicators, nonstate actors, 
and scholars are unlikely to accept any wholesale normative prioritization of 
the two regimes, and they will continue to advance competing claims in the 
many diverse venues made possible by the international legal system’s disag-
gregated structure. Continued engagement of the two regimes is therefore 
inevitable. Providing a constructive framework for analyzing and facilitating 
that engagement is one of the principal motivations for writing this book. 
 8.2.  Assessing Existing Proposals to Reconcile Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property 
 Th e analyses in this book and in our previously published articles and essays 
on which it is based are by no means the only attempts to analyze the rela-
tionship between the human rights and intellectual property regimes. A 
number of scholars and international expert bodies have made thoughtful 
interventions on these issues over the past decade, and their arguments and 
proposals have enriched our own ideas about the subject. In previous chap-
ters of this book, we give these commentators and experts pride of place by 
reproducing and engaging with key extracts of their writings. Here, we paint 
with a broader brush. We group these contributions into three broad and 
admittedly simplifi ed categories, highlighting common themes, strengths, 
and weaknesses and laying the groundwork for our own analysis. 
 Th e fi rst group of scholars emphasizes the importance of rediscovering 
the historical record. 1 For these commentators, resolving the normative 
 tensions engendered by the intersection of human rights and intellectual 
property requires unearthing the original understanding of the long-for-
gotten creators’ rights and cultural benefi t clauses in UDHR Article 27 and 
 1  See, e.g ., Audrey Chapman,  Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations 
Relating to Article 15(1)(c ), 35  Copyright Bull . 4 (2001); ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. 
and Cultural Rights,  Draft ing History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000) ( prepared by Maria 
Green); Lea Shaver,  Th e Right to Science and Culture , 2010  Wisc. L. Rev . 121 (2010); Lea 
Shaver & Caterina Sganga,  Th e Right to Take Part in Cultural Life :  On Copyright and Human 
Rights , 27  Wisc. Int’l L. Rev . 637 (2009); Peter K. Yu,  Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property 
Interests in a Human Rights Framework , 40  U.C. Davis L. Rev . 1039 (2007); Paul Torremans, 
 Copyright as a Human Right , in  Paul L. C. Torremans (Ed.), Copyright and Human 
Rights: Freedom of Expression –  Intellectual Property –  Privacy 1 ( 2004 ). 
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ICESCR Article 15. As we explain in greater detail in  Chapter 3 , these clauses 
set forth legal obligations and policy objectives closely analogous to those 
embodied in intellectual property systems. Like the latter systems, the texts 
of Article 27 and of Article 15, when read together, obligate  governments 
to recognize and reward human creativity and innovation and, at the same 
time, to ensure public access to the fruits of those endeavors. Striking the 
appropriate balance between these two goals is the central challenge that 
both regimes share. 
 One of the aims of this historical research is to rediscover how the women 
and men who wrote Articles 27 and 15 understood that this crucial balance 
would be struck. By carefully parsing the negotiating histories and the wider 
political and social contexts that gave birth to these clauses, commentators 
hope to explain why the draft ers included the moral and material interests 
of creators and the public’s right to enjoy the benefi ts of that creativity in 
universal human rights instruments. For some scholars, however, this enter-
prise is also a precursor to a second, more ambitious goal: to provide a his-
torical justifi cation for giving greater weight to the public side of the balance 
between access and innovation and concomitantly reduced protections for 
the creators and owners of intellectual property products. 
 We fully support the fi rst objective but are more skeptical of the second. 
Shedding light on this obscure corner of the human rights regime is undoubt-
edly a worthy endeavor. However, the historical record provides only  limited 
and ultimately inconclusive guidance. It demonstrates that the draft ers strongly 
endorsed the right to participate in culture and to enjoy the  benefi ts of sci-
entifi c progress and its applications, rejected proposals to include  copyright 
 protection in the UDHR and ICESCR, and divided over the decision to 
 recognize creators’ rights as human rights. In the absence of greater specifi c-
ity, however, the draft ing history is too slender a reed on which to ground an 
alternative framework for how states should balance these competing goals. 
 Th is use of history is misguided in another respect. Human rights law 
and intellectual property law are both famously dynamic, readily adapting 
to changing circumstances through new rounds of treaty making, interpre-
tations by international tribunals, and revisions of national laws. A frame-
work that privileges the original understanding of Articles 27 and 15 fails to 
engage with this dynamism and with the evolutions in law, politics, social 
values, and technology that engendered these adaptations. 
 A second group of scholars views the increasing attention to intellectual 
property issues in the human rights regime as an opportunity to reexamine 
tools that already exist in national intellectual property laws and treaties that 
help government decision makers to strike a socially optimal balance between 
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incentivizing private innovation and enriching the cultural,  scientifi c, and 
information commons. 2 For these commentators, gazing at intellectual 
property through a human rights lens illuminates the fact that governments 
have rarely used many of these policy levers or have allowed them to fall 
into desuetude. Once revived or expanded, this argument continues, these 
tools – which include subject matter exclusions, exceptions and limitations, 
compulsory licenses, and special and diff erential treatment of developing 
countries – can fully achieve the goals that the intellectual property system 
shares with the human rights regime while avoiding the risks of importing 
rights claims that are less susceptible to utilitarian balancing. 
 We endorse calls to revive and expand policy levers that have long been 
part of the intellectual property regime as a formal matter but that are infre-
quently utilized in practice, whether because of lack of familiarity or pressure 
from international organizations, developed countries, or intellectual prop-
erty industries. And we agree with the conclusions of international expert 
bodies that the “fl exibilities” in intellectual property treaties and statutes are 
salutary on their own terms as well as essential to maintain compatibility 
with international human rights law. We part company with these scholars 
and experts, however, to the extent they assert that bolstering these policy 
tools is not only necessary but also suffi  cient to reconcile the human rights 
and intellectual property regimes. 
 We reject this conclusion as a matter of both principle and practical poli-
tics. As a matter of principle, fl exibility mechanisms provide breathing space 
for governments to promote a wide range of objectives that confl ict or are in 
tension with expansive intellectual property protection rules. Commentators 
have off ered numerous suggestions for manipulating these policy levers to 
enhance economic development, foster local innovation, and increase tech-
nology transfers from developed to developing countries. Th ese are salutary 
goals, to be sure. But they are insuffi  ciently connected to the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Stated another way, intellectual property 
 2  See, e.g ., P. B. Hugenholtz,  Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe , in  Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Harry First, & Diane Leheer Zimmerman (Eds.), Innovation 
Policy in an Information Age (2000); P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji,  Conceiving 
an International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright: Final Report 
(Mar. 2008),  available at  http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/fi nalreport2008.pdf ; 
Ruth Okediji,  Securing Intellectual Property Objectives: New Approaches to Human Rights 
Considerations , in  Margot E. Salomon et al.  (E ds.), Casting the Net Wider: Human 
Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers 211 ( 2007 ); A. Strowel & F. Tulkens, 
 Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, and Access , 
in  J. Griffiths & U. Suthersanen (Eds .),  Copyright and Free Speech, Comparative 
and International Analyses ( 2005 ). 
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fl exibility mechanisms expand the regulatory space available to governments. 
Yet they off er at best only limited guidance for restructuring creativity and 
innovation policies to promote human rights, including the treaty obliga-
tions and customary rules that the vast majority of states have ratifi ed and 
recognized as legally binding. 
 As a matter of practical politics, calls to revivify intellectual property fl ex-
ibility mechanisms face a major structural challenge, one that  engagement 
with the international human rights regime can help to overcome. In the 
existing intellectual property system, the producers and owners of  intellectual 
property products are the only “rights” holders. All other actors –  consumers, 
future creators, and the public generally – are relegated to an implicitly  inferior 
status. Recognizing this imbalance, commentators have recently introduced 
proposals for “users’ rights,” “maximum standards” of intellectual property 
protection, and new international instruments that make exceptions and 
limitations mandatory rather than permissive. 
 We believe that many of these initiatives, although benefi cial, are misguided 
in a number of respects. First, the proposals are at odds with more than a 
century of international intellectual property lawmaking in which treaties 
establish only basic ground rules (such as national treatment) and minimum 
standards of protection (such as subject matter eligibility rules and exclusive 
rights). Expanding this settled approach to embrace user rights and manda-
tory exceptions and limitations is a challenging and contested enterprise, as 
demonstrated by recent debates in WIPO on proposals for a treaty on access 
for the visually impaired. 3 In contrast, arguments grounded in human rights 
reframe the demands of consumers, future creators, and the public as inter-
nationally guaranteed entitlements that are conceptually equivalent to those 
of intellectual property owners and producers. 
 Th is linguistic shift  is not a semantic trick; nor is it merely a rhetorical 
move. It also reshapes normative agendas and negotiating strategies. From a 
normative perspective, such a reframing directs intellectual property reform 
advocates to work within international human rights venues – in particular 
the treaty bodies and the special rapporteurs and independent experts of the 
Human Rights Council whose activities we examine in previous chapters – to 
clarify ambiguous legal norms and evaluate the human rights consequences 
of existing intellectual property laws and policies. It would be myopic for 
 3  See, e.g ., James Boyle,  Obama’s Mixed Record on Tech Policy ,  Fin. Times (Jan. 25, 2010); 
Manon Ress,  Six Myths about the Treaty for People with Disabilities Th at Should Be Debunked 
Next Week? , Knowledge Ecology International (Mar. 5, 2010),  available at  http://keionline.
org/node/795 . 
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these reform advocates to refrain from infl uencing these human rights actors 
and, where appropriate, from forging alliances with them, especially now 
that these actors have devoted signifi cant attention to national and interna-
tional intellectual property protection rules. 
 From a negotiating perspective, reform arguments that draw upon the 
output of these human rights venues have a distinct strategic advantage. Th ey 
invoke legal rules and norms adopted by institutions whose provenance and 
legitimacy are well established and that have received the imprimatur of many 
governments in other international fora. By drawing upon these sources, 
reform advocates can more credibly claim that a rebalancing of intellectual 
property protection rules is necessary to harmonize two parallel regimes of 
internationally recognized “rights.” And they can more easily defl ect claims 
that such rebalancing eff orts are merely fi g leaves for self-serving legislation 
by well-resourced user industries or disguised attempts to distort free trade 
rules or free ride on foreign creators and inventors. 
 A third approach to reconciling human rights and intellectual property 
employs the rules of the former regime to bolster arguments for expand-
ing or diminishing the rules of the latter. 4 Expansionist arguments are oft en 
raised by industries that view their business models and fi nancial viability 
as tied to the exclusive exploitation rights that intellectual property protec-
tion confers. Seizing upon (and oft en misreading) the creators’ rights and 
property rights clauses of international instruments, these industries seek to 
lock in maximalist intellectual property protection by invoking the  rhetoric 
of human rights as trumps. A fear of such expansionist claims – and the 
perceived diffi  culty of refuting them – explains why some commentators 
are skeptical of attempts to analyze intellectual property issues in human 
rights terms. 
 4  See, e.g ., Audrey R. Chapman,  Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefi ts 
of Scientifi c Progress and Its Applications , 8  J. Hum. Rts . 1 (2009); Christophe Geiger, 
 “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? Th e Infl uence of Fundamental Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the European Union , 37  Int ’ l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition 
L . 371 (2006); Christophe Geiger,  Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of 
Intellectual Property Law? , 35  Int ’ l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L . 268 (2004); 
Tom Giovanetti & Merrill Matthews, Institute for Policy Innovation,  Intellectual Property 
Rights and Human Rights , IDEAS, Sept. 2005,  available at  http://www.ipi.org ; Burkhart 
Goebel,  Geographical Indications and Trademarks in Europe , 95  Trademark Rep . 1165 
(2005);  see also Kal Raustiala,  Density and Confl ict in International Intellectual Property 
Law , 40 U.C.  Davis L. Rev . 1021, 1032 (2007) (stating that “the embrace of [intellectual 
property] by human rights advocates and entities … is likely to further entrench some 
dangerous ideas about property: in particular, that property rights as human rights ought 
to be inviolable and ought to receive extremely solicitous attention from the international 
community”). 
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 Th ese fears are not entirely unfounded, especially in Europe. Th e recently 
adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU) 
 subsumes intellectual property under the rubric of property, and provides 
in Article 17(2) that “Intellectual property shall be protected.” References to 
fundamental rights appear in the recitals of several EU directives on intel-
lectual property. A few national courts in Europe have relied on property 
guarantees in their respective constitutions when adjudicating intellectual 
property disputes. And, as discussed in  Chapter 3 , the European Court of 
Human Rights has extended the right of property in Protocol No. 1 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights to copyrights, patents, and trade-
marks owned by both corporations and individuals. 
 Viewed in isolation, these trends appear ominous. But they are 
 counterbalanced by a large and growing number of international and 
 domestic decisions, in Europe and elsewhere, that invoke civil and political 
rights (in particular freedom of expression) and economic and social rights 
(in particular the right to health) to limit or cabin expansive interpretations 
of intellectual property protection rules. Commentators and public interest 
NGOs have endorsed these developments, urging decision makers to reach 
outside intellectual property’s own fl exibility mechanisms and safety valves 
to impose external limits, or maximum standards of protection, upon intel-
lectual property owners. 
 Th ese two opposing frameworks share a common methodology. Each begins 
with the existing baseline of intellectual property protection and then invokes 
selective provisions of international human rights law to bolster arguments for 
moving that baseline in one direction or the other. Th e frameworks also share 
a common fl aw. Th ey encourage uncoordinated interventions at the upper and 
lower boundaries of intellectual property protection, interventions that, over 
time, would establish both a fl oor and a ceiling on intellectual property. 
 Th is selective use of human rights law to impose upper and lower  limits on 
intellectual property protection standards is worrisome. Th ese eff orts have 
mostly ignored the creators’ rights and cultural rights provisions of UDHR 
Article 27 and ICESCR Article 15. Th ey have instead invoked human rights 
that are unconcerned with balancing the protection of creators and innovators 
against the public’s right to benefi t from the scientifi c and cultural advances. 
Lacking a coherent blueprint to undertake the sensitive and  policy-laden 
analysis that such balancing requires, human rights interventions at the 
upper and lower boundaries of intellectual property law will inevitably be 
ad hoc. Th ey may also create cycles of underprotection and overprotection, 
depending on the vagaries of which issues are raised, in which venues, and 
in what order. 
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 8.3.  Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property 
 In this section, we off er our own framework for understanding the interface 
between human rights and intellectual property. As we explain in greater 
detail below, our framework diff ers from the approaches reviewed previously 
in several important respects. First, it is capacious, encompassing the full 
panoply of human rights and freedoms whose realization is aff ected by intel-
lectual property protection rules. Second, our framework rejects  arguments 
that invoke human rights to leverage across-the-board expansions or 
 rollbacks of intellectual property protection. Th ird, our framework is empir-
ically grounded. It urges governments, before revising the status quo, fi rst to 
determine whether and to what extent intellectual property – as opposed to 
other factors – impedes or enhances the attainment of desired human rights 
outcomes. Fourth, our framework is dynamic. It draws inspiration from the 
draft ing history of the creators’ rights and cultural benefi t clauses, but rec-
ognizes that the human rights and intellectual property regimes are contin-
ually evolving in response to changing conceptions of legal entitlements and 
 technological progress. 
 As an initial matter, we distinguish between the  protective and  restrictive 
dimensions of human rights in the intellectual property context. Th e protec-
tive dimension requires states (1) to recognize and respect the rights of indi-
viduals and groups to enjoy a modicum of economic and moral benefi t from 
their creative and innovative activities and (2) to refrain from bad faith and 
arbitrary interferences with intellectual property rights that the state itself 
has previously granted or recognized. In contrast, the restrictive dimension, 
which includes both a process component and a substantive standard, identi-
fi es the conditions under which the realization of a specifi c right or freedom 
requires (1) a diminution of intellectual property protection standards and 
enforcement measures, (2) a restructuring of incentives for private creativity 
and innovation, or (3) both. 
 Our framework also stresses the importance of the process, transparency, 
and predictability values that are hallmarks of the rule of law. 5 Th e founding 
documents of the international human rights movement did not emphasize 
 5  Th ere are many diff erent conceptions of the rule of law.  See Note, Th om Ringer,  Development, 
Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the “Rule 
of Law” and Its Place in Development Th eory and Practice , 10  Yale Hum. Rts. & Develop. 
L.J . 178 (2007). For a recent application to international intellectual property,  see Laurence 
R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter, & M. Florencia Guerzovich,  Islands of Eff ective International 
Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community , 
103  Am. J. Int ’ l L . 1 (2009). 
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the rule of law. Today, however, the connection between human rights and 
the rule of law is well established 6 and provides additional arguments for con-
testing intellectual property initiatives that confl ict with rule of law values. 
 A salient recent example is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), a proposed multilateral treaty that would establish more robust 
obligations to suppress unauthorized uses of intellectual property. For two 
years, ACTA negotiations occurred in secret and governments refused to dis-
close a draft  text of the treaty. Only aft er a French civil rights NGO leaked a 
document revealing “contradictions between the text and public comments 
by negotiators” 7 did governments release an offi  cial text. 8 Such lack of trans-
parency involving potentially far-reaching changes to intellectual property 
laws and enforcement mechanisms is disturbing, as is the inability of inter-
ested constituencies, in the words of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, to “take part in … any signifi cant decision making processes 
that have an impact on their rights and legitimate interests.” 9 
 A.  Th e Protective Dimension of the Framework 
 Th e protective dimension of the human rights framework for intellectual 
property is grounded in state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfi ll cre-
ators’ rights and the right of property found in several international instru-
ments, most notably UDHR Article 27, ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), and Article 
1 of the European Convention’s First Protocol. 
 Obligations with regard to creators’ rights encompass modest economic 
exploitation and personality guarantees that, taken together, are more cir-
cumscribed than those imposed by intellectual property treaties. Th e limited 
scope of these guarantees can be deduced from the two principal objectives 
of recognizing the moral and material interests of creators as human rights. 
 6  See generally Randall Peerenboom,  Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship? , 
36  Geo. Int ’ l L.J. 809 (2005). 
 7  Monika Ermert,  Leaked ACTA Text Shows Possible Contradictions with National Laws , 
Intellectual Property Watch (Mar. 29, 2010),  available at  http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2010/03/29/leaked-acta-text-shows-possible-contradictions-with-national-laws/ . 
 8  Th e Offi  ce of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners 
on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Apr. 16, 2010),  available at  http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-offi  ce/press-releases/2010/april/offi  ce-us-trade-representative-releases-statement-ac . 
Th e U.S. Trade Representative stressed that “ACTA will not interfere with a signatory’s abil-
ity to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties, and will be consistent with the … 
TRIPS Agreement and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.”  Id . 
 9  Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,  General Comment No. 17: Th e Right of Everyone to 
Benefi t from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientifi c, 
Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author , art. 15(1)(c), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
GC17, para. 34 (Jan. 12, 2006). 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property514
According to the  General Comment 17 of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, analyzed in depth in  Chapter 3 , such rights “safeguard 
the personal link between authors and their creations and between people 
or other groups and their collective cultural heritage,” and they protect the 
“basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an 
adequate standard of living.” 
 We interpret these two statements, which recur throughout the  General 
Comment , to imply the existence of a zone of personal autonomy in which 
individuals can achieve their creative potential, control their productive 
 output, and lead the independent intellectual lives that are essential requisites 
of any free society. Th e legal protections required to establish this zone are, 
however, signifi cantly narrower than those mandated by intellectual property 
treaties and statutes. As an initial matter, these protections do not apply to 
corporations or other business entities. But even as to individuals and groups, 
a state can satisfy its obligation to protect creators’ rights in myriad and 
diverse ways. It may, for example, recognize the same exclusive rights as are 
found in intellectual property treaties and statutes, but  radically reduce terms 
of protection, expand exceptions and limitations, or both. Alternatively, a 
state could eschew exclusive rights altogether (except for minimal  attribution 
and integrity guarantees) and substitute a system of liability rules, levies, or 
government subsidies. 10 Under either approach, governments could also des-
ignate certain socially valuable uses of knowledge goods as not requiring any 
remuneration to creators. 
 Th e protective dimension of the human rights framework is  more expan-
sive than existing intellectual property protection rules in only two respects. 
First, it encompasses all individuals and groups; the categorical exclusion of 
a class of creators would be inconsistent with the framework. Th e absence 
of protection in some countries for the traditional knowledge of indigenous 
communities is one example, although, as we discuss at the end of Chapter 
7, the potential confl icts between the recognition and assertion of rights in 
indigenous creativity and other human rights must also be considered. 
 Second, the protective dimension of the framework imposes a more strin-
gent test for evaluating restrictions  within the irreducible core of rights 
that establishes the zone of autonomy described earlier. Such restrictions 
must, among other requirements, be “strictly necessary for the promotion 
of the general welfare in a democratic society” and must employ “the least 
 10  For a thoughtful discussion of liability rules,  see Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. 
Uhlir, & Colin Crossman,  Pathways across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property 
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery , 8  Yale Journal of Health Law, Policy & 
Ethics 53, 78–80 (2008). 
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restrictive measures … when several types of limitations may be imposed.” 
Th is  standard is substantially more constraining than the now ubiquitous 
“three-step test” used to assess the TRIPS-compatibility of exceptions and 
limitations in national intellectual property laws. 11 For this reason, the rights 
included in the core must be concomitantly narrow. 
 We emphasize, however, the limited practical consequences of these 
additional obligations. For traditional knowledge, for example, a state 
could eschew exclusive rights altogether in favor of government assistance 
 programs that seek to preserve the creative works of indigenous commu-
nities  consistently with their religious beliefs and cultural traditions. As for 
restrictions on  creators’ human rights, these must be interpreted in light of 
the narrowness of the zone of autonomy itself and the many permissible 
approaches to establishing that zone. 
 Th e protective dimension of the human rights framework for intellectual 
property may also justify more expansive legal protections for individuals and 
groups vis-à-vis other actors involved in the production and distribution of 
knowledge goods. For example, the framework’s emphasis on human crea-
tivity rather than economic exploitation may support a more circumscribed 
approach to work for hire rules that grant authorship and control of copy-
righted works to corporate employers at the expense of those who work for 
them. But nothing requires that any revisions of domestic intellectual property 
laws adhere to any particular template. To the contrary, the protective dimen-
sion of the framework preserves wide latitude for states to regulate innovation 
and creativity to achieve socially benefi cial ends and to tailor regulations to 
political, economic, and cultural conditions within their borders. 
 Th e property rights component of the protective dimension is similarly 
modest. Government offi  cials included the right of property in the UDHR 
and in the three regional civil and political rights conventions but excluded 
it from the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Th is omission reveals that many coun-
tries have no treaty-based obligation to protect private property as a human 
right, although they may protect property on other legal grounds. And for 
states that do have such an international obligation, the treaties’ draft ing 
histories evidence a clear intent to preserve latitude for governments to 
adopt economic and social policies that adversely aff ect property owners 
while, at the same time, condemning arbitrary deprivations of property by 
state actors. 
 11  For example, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “members shall confi ne limi-
tations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not confl ict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the right holder.” 
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 Among the three regional treaties that include a property rights clause, 
only the European system has considered whether that provision encom-
passes ownership of intangible knowledge goods. In  Chapter 3 , we analyze 
recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights that answer this 
question in the affi  rmative and also emphasize the limited protection that 
the Court’s case law provides. Here we off er more general guidance to deci-
sion makers as to how to interpret the human right of property as applied to 
 intellectual property. 
 Consistent with the rule of law values that these treaty clauses embody, 
decision makers should fi nd fault only with arbitrary or  ultra vires exercises 
of state power and bad faith refusals to follow intellectual property protec-
tion rules that the state itself has previously recognized as valid. Such actions 
include, for example, a government ministry that installs copyrighted soft -
ware on its desktop computers without providing statutorily mandated 
remuneration to the soft ware’s owner, a state-run enterprise that refuses to 
pay royalties to an inventor whose locally patented process it had previously 
licensed, and judicial or administrative rules that eschew minimum proce-
dural guarantees such as the ability to present evidence or legal arguments. 
 As these examples illustrate, the restrictions imposed by treaty-based 
 property rights clauses are minimal and unobtrusive. Th ey allow  governments 
unfettered discretion to fashion their domestic innovation and creativity 
 policies as they see fi t, provided only that they adhere to the previously estab-
lished rules that embody those policies. Th is narrow focus also justifi es the 
application of these principles to intellectual property owned by corpora-
tions and other business entities, since arbitrary and bad faith deprivations 
of property are not confi ned to natural persons. 
 B.  Th e Restrictive Dimension of the Framework 
 Th e restrictive dimension of the framework comes into play where a state 
expands legal protections for creativity and innovation beyond those required 
to establish the zone of personal autonomy described in the  previous sub-
section. Th ere are longstanding debates over whether capacious intellec-
tual property protection helps or hinders economic growth, especially in 
 least-developed and developing countries. But even assuming for purposes 
of argument that advocates for strong intellectual property protection have 
the better of this debate, they must still contend with the obligations that 
 international human rights law imposes, obligations that may provide an 
independent legal basis for cabining strong intellectual property protection 
rules  even if they enhance economic development. We part company, however, 
with commentators who invoke human rights to support an  across-the-board 
Conclusion 517
rollback of intellectual property without regard to context or to the ways in 
which it can be harnessed to promote the realization of human rights. We 
advance instead an approach that is both faithful to the diversity of individ-
ual rights and freedoms and grounded in empirical reality. 
 We begin from the uncontroversial premise that the ends of international 
human rights law – including noninterference with civil and political rights 
and guaranteeing minimum levels of economic and social well-being in areas 
such as health, food, and education – can be achieved in a wide variety of 
ways. Intellectual property protection can help or hinder the attainment 
of these ends, or it may be entirely irrelevant to their realization. Th e fi rst 
component of the framework’s restrictive dimension, therefore, is a process 
inquiry that seeks to determine what role, if any, intellectual property protec-
tion actually plays in this regard. 
 If the institutions, resources, personnel, and other inputs necessary to 
achieve desired human rights outcomes do not exist or are inadequate, the 
issue of whether intellectual property also impedes those outcomes may be 
entirely irrelevant. Stated diff erently, the barriers to realizing human rights 
are oft en overdetermined, with intellectual property functioning as only one 
among a multiplicity of barriers, and not necessarily the most important one. 
Th is analysis harkens back to debates in the early 2000s, discussed in  Chapter 
2 , as to whether pharmaceutical patents hindered access to HIV/AIDS medi-
cations in sub-Saharan Africa. Even if antiretroviral drugs were given to these 
countries free of charge, proponents of strong patent protection claimed, the 
public health infrastructure needed to distribute them was inadequate and 
the individuals who received the medicines were incapable of following direc-
tions for their ingestion without the assistance of medical professionals. 
 Nearly a decade later, these arguments have proven to be mostly groundless. 
But the basic insight underlying these claims – that multiple factors unrelated to 
intellectual property oft en act as barriers to human rights outcomes – remains 
valid. It is diffi  cult to contend, for example, that copyright in educational mate-
rials impedes the right to education if there are no school buildings and no 
teachers. Th is illustration is, admittedly, an oversimplifi cation. As the discus-
sion in  Chapter 5 reveals, however, even in countries with more fully func-
tional educational systems, the adverse consequences of copyright protection 
are oft en minimal in comparison to factors such as language barriers, small 
domestic publishing industries, and tariff s on paper imports. Another rele-
vant variable is the extent to which educational materials are available online 
without charge. Empirical analyses that consider such availability should not, 
however, presume that such materials are uniformly available; nor should they 
ignore the many economic and technological barriers to online access. 
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 For other human rights, by contrast, the concern is not with structural fac-
tors that impede access to goods protected by intellectual property but, to the 
contrary, with the qualities or attributes of goods that are oft en widely distrib-
uted. As explained in  Chapter 6 on the right to food, opposition to intellectual 
property protection for new plant varieties is oft en bound up with fears about 
the health and environmental consequences of genetically modifi ed crops or 
opposition to the marketing practices of agrobiotechnology fi rms. Th ese are 
legitimate concerns. But the proper response to them is not – or at least not 
necessarily – a diminution of intellectual property protection. Rather, what is 
fi rst required is a careful evaluation of the human rights implications of these 
claims and the role that intellectual property does or does not play in exacerbat-
ing them. If further studies reveal, for example, that certain genetically modi-
fi ed crops are harmful to human health or to farmers who grow traditional 
plant varieties, an appropriate response by health, environment, or agriculture 
ministries would be to regulate or prohibit the distribution and sale of such 
crops. Similarly, if the consolidation of the commercial seed industry enables 
a few fi rms with excessive market power to demand artifi cially high prices for 
seeds, the remedy lies in national competition laws rather than in restricting 
intellectual property rules that create incentives for new plant varieties with 
desirable characteristics. In addition, it may be useful to distinguish between 
problems caused by the subsistence of intellectual property rights in genetically 
modifi ed plant varieties as such, and problems engendered by the decisions of 
public and private actors to adopt, promote, or subsidize such varieties. 
 Th e determination of whether and to what extent intellectual property, as 
opposed to other factors, impedes the attainment of desired human rights 
outcomes requires careful, objective, and context-specifi c empirical assess-
ments. Over the last several years, a growing array of international bodies, 
NGOs, and scholars have turned their attention to the previously understud-
ied issue of how to measure the enjoyment of human rights. Th e result has 
been an outpouring of indicators, metrics, benchmarks, impact  statements, 
and other measurement tools that seek to identify with greater precision 
the levels of rights protections in individual countries and the factors that 
 contribute to or retard their achievement. Most of these tools focus on eco-
nomic and social rights, whose realization requires identifying aggregate 
outcomes at the societal as well as the individual level. Th ese quantitative and 
 qualitative indicators and benchmarks have become key elements of the iter-
ative process by which treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, and national courts 
monitor the progressive realization of rights that the ICESCR protects. 12 
 12  See, e.g ., Alana Klein,  Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights , 39  Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev . 351 (2008); Offi  ce of 
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 Th ese measurement tools do not, as far as we are aware, systematically 
assess the positive and negative consequences of intellectual property protec-
tion on human rights in general or on economic and social rights in particu-
lar. But they could easily be revised to include such an evaluative component. 
A harbinger of this approach is a 2006 report of the National Human Rights 
Commission of Th ailand, which reviewed a draft  Th ailand–United States 
Free Trade Agreement. 13 Among other issues, the Commission analyzed the 
treaty’s inclusion of TRIPS Plus provisions from the perspective of the right 
to health and farmers’ rights. It recommended,  inter alia , that the Th ai gov-
ernment remove from the negotiations stronger intellectual property protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals. 14 As other commentators have observed, however, 
the report also used “emotive language and strong claims about the eff ects of 
the FTA without recourse to empirical evidence to support those claims.” 15 
 Th e political contestations surrounding the Th ai Commission’s report 
highlight the need to develop, in advance of any particular controversy, mea-
surement tools that have been accepted by stakeholders with divergent view-
points, or at least that refl ect their input. Th ese measurement tools should 
include at least the following components: (1) an evaluation of whether 
existing or proposed intellectual property protection rules and policies help 
or hinder the realization of specifi c human rights outcomes; (2) an assess-
ment, to the greatest extent possible, of the relative causal contributions of 
intellectual property rules and policies in comparison to other factors; and 
(3) an identifi cation of the legal and policy measures, whether or not consis-
tent with the existing intellectual property regime, that will facilitate these 
human rights outcomes. 
 If the assessment of these issues reveals that non-intellectual property fac-
tors are responsible for the lack of progress in realizing human rights ends, 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights,  Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance 
with Human Rights Instruments , U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/7 (2006); AnnJanette Rosga & 
Margaret L. Satterthwaite,  Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights , 27  Berkeley J. 
Int ’ l L . 254 (2009); Lea Shaver,  Defi ning and Measuring Access to Knowledge: Towards an 
A2K Index , Yale Law School Student Scholarship Papers,  available at  http://digitalcommons.
law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22/ (2007); Sally Engle Merry,  Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights, and Global Governance (May 2009),  available at  http://www.iilj.org/research/
documents/I.Merry.MeasuringtheworldASIL.pdf . 
 13  See National Human Rights Institutions Forum,  Human Rights Impact Assessment of the 
US–Th ai Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 22, 2007),  available at  http://www.nhri.net/news.
asp?ID=1115 . 
 14  See James Harrison & Alessa Goller,  Trade and Human Rights: What Does “Impact 
Assessment” Have to Off er? , 8  Hum. Rts. L. Rev . 587, 604 (2008). 
 15  Id . at 608 (quoting infl amatory statements in the commission’s report, including that the 
treaty will “pave the way for [transnational corporations] to seize power” and “US demands 
on patents … clearly refl ect greed on [the] part of US pharmaceutical corporations”). 
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as may be the case for the example of genetically modifi ed crops discussed 
earlier, state and nonstate actors should focus their lawmaking and advocacy 
strategies on those factors and should not treat intellectual property issues as 
a proxy for them. Such categorical outcomes are likely to be rare, however. A 
more frequent result of the assessment process will be a fi nding that the spe-
cifi c intellectual property rule or policy under scrutiny is one among many 
factors responsible for deleterious human rights conditions. Such a conclu-
sion implicates policy responses that address both the share of the problem 
attributable to intellectual property and the type and extent of the harm that 
it engenders. Th e structure of domestic institutions, the extent of available 
resources and their reallocation, the sequencing of policy prescriptions, and 
the interrelationship among government programs will be important issues 
in this regard. We hope that the analysis set forth in previous chapters of this 
book will assist all stakeholders in addressing these issues. 
 In the fi nal analysis, however, national decision makers will need to decide 
whether to revise existing intellectual property protection rules and how 
best to do so. It is here that the second, substantive stage of the framework’s 
restrictive dimension comes into play. In deciding what measures to take, we 
urge decision makers to begin from the premise that the human rights and 
intellectual property regimes share the same core objective – to encourage 
creativity and innovation that benefi ts society as a whole. It is the diff erent 
ways that each regime achieves this objective, which create the potential for 
confl icts between them. 
 In the intellectual property system, most societal benefi ts accrue far in 
the future when knowledge goods enter the public domain and may be 
freely used by all. Flexibility mechanisms such as exceptions to exclusive 
rights and compulsory licenses mitigate the costs of this delay. But they can 
only do so much without harming the incentives to create and innovate in 
the fi rst instance. In contrast, the human rights regime has much shorter 
time horizons. Th e legal entitlements it enshrines are both immediate and 
urgent. Th e regime has  little tolerance for states that lack the present ability 
to meet their negative obligation to refrain from repression or their positive 
 commitment to protect and fulfi ll the minimum essential needs of individu-
als and groups. 
 Intellectual property-protected knowledge goods help to satisfy these 
immediate demands when the owners of these goods sell or license them to 
consumers. But the monopoly power that accompanies intellectual property 
rights enables owners to maximize profi ts by off ering knowledge goods at 
supracompetitive prices that exclude consumers who would have purchased 
or licensed the goods had they been off ered in a competitive market. Th e 
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result is that individuals with greater fi nancial means can aff ord knowledge 
goods whereas those with fewer economic resources cannot. 
 Th ese disparities in aff ordability apply to intellectual property-protected 
goods currently being off ered for sale or license. But the disparities are 
exacerbated when incentives to create and innovate are considered from a 
dynamic perspective. Intellectual property industries respond to existing 
market signals by fashioning research and development strategies to  satisfy 
the anticipated demands of consumers with fi nancial means. Th e perni-
cious consequences of these dynamic innovation incentives are illustrated 
most starkly in the area of patented medicines. As we analyze in  Chapter 2 , 
 pharmaceutical companies devote the bulk of their research eff orts to iden-
tifying new drugs for ailments common in wealthy industrialized nations 
while eschewing research on diseases that affl  ict the world’s poor, who can-
not aff ord any treatments the companies might have developed. 
 Th e intellectual property system is generally agnostic about both the static 
and the dynamic distributional consequences of monopoly pricing struc-
tures. But these distributional consequences are a central concern of human 
rights law in general and economic and social rights in particular, which pri-
oritize the needs of the most marginalized and disadvantaged individuals 
and groups above the needs of those with greater fi nancial means. Stated 
more pointedly, intellectual property protection may help states to satisfy 
their obligations to protect and fulfi ll economic and social rights. But its 
eff ect is greatest where it is needed least. 
 Th ere are short-term and long-term responses to this troubling state 
of aff airs. Both responses depend upon the fi ndings of the indicators and 
impact statements described previously. If these measurement tools reveal 
that specifi c intellectual property protection rules are (or, in the case of 
 proposed rules, would be) an immediate obstacle to the realization of specifi c 
human rights, governments should revise those rules or, in the case of new 
rules, reject proposals to adopt them. Impact statements structured accord-
ing to our recommendations should also indicate which legal and policy 
measures would help to achieve this result. All other things equal, we think 
that governments should favor measures compatible with the existing intel-
lectual  property regime over measures that are inconsistent with it. But we 
also believe that governments should be free to choose intellectual property-
inconsistent measures where the indicators and impact statements contain 
credible evidence that such measures are likely to achieve more extensive 
human rights benefi ts. Where the evidence is equivocal or uncertain, mea-
sures should be temporary and include sunset clauses to force a revaluation 
of their merits an appropriate interval aft er their adoption. 
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 With regard to long-term responses, indicators and impact statements 
should provide a roadmap for governments to restructure innovation incen-
tives to further human rights ends. Strategies to encourage research relating 
to neglected diseases have advanced further in this regard than initiatives in 
other areas. As described in  Chapter 2 on the right to health and pharmaceuti-
cal patents, these strategies work  with intellectual property rather than  against 
it. Th ey redirect incentives and channel market forces to achieve socially valu-
able ends. Th omas Pogge’s research program on human rights and global 
health is perhaps the most advanced proposal in this regard. We urge states, 
public interest NGOs, and the staff  of international organizations to develop 
similar proposals for other intersections between the human rights and intel-
lectual property regimes and to tailor incentive structures to the diverse eco-
nomic and political realities that we describe in previous chapters. 
 In developing these proposals, actors should also consider whether non-
proprietary innovation schemes can help to achieve salutary human rights 
outcomes. For example, open source systems that require follow-on innova-
tors to share their contribution to collectively produced knowledge goods 
should be encouraged, provided that the system’s policies are fully disclosed 
to participants. Private contracting and delegation mechanisms, such as 
Creative Commons, that permit creators to disclaim intellectual property 
protection in whole or in part deserve similar solicitude. But as with online 
access to educational materials, the widespread accessibility of nonpropri-
etary alternatives should not be assumed. Where access disparities exist, an 
overemphasis on nonproprietary mechanisms may have the perverse if unin-
tended eff ect of disfavoring the less technologically adept or those burdened 
by economic barriers to online access. Inattention to access disparities thus 
creates a risk that nonproprietary alternatives will be least available to those 
who require them most. 
 Even assuming widespread and equitable access, nonproprietary alterna-
tives may appear contrary to the protective dimension of the human rights 
framework for intellectual property, which, as described previously, protects 
a zone of personal autonomy for all creators. In practice, there may be no 
incompatibility if individuals retain the right to be acknowledged as creators 
and to receive remuneration for at least some uses. Th e more fundamental 
point, however, is that although creators and innovators do indeed possess a 
narrow class of inalienable economic and personality rights, they can choose 
how best to exercise those rights so as to construct a zone of personal auton-
omy that is both self-empowering and conducive to the broader public values 
that the human rights framework for intellectual property seeks to achieve. 
 
